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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(2008). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue #1: Did the trial court err in finding as a matter of law that an easement 
was created by plat, creating a new type of easement while ignoring the four types of 
easements (express, implied, necessity, and prescriptive) recognized under Utah 
law? 
Standard of review: Correctness or de novo. "The question of whether or not an 
easement exists is a conclusion of law/' Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95. TJ7; 
977 P.2d 533. On appeal, the court reviews "the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's conclusions of 
law." Id 
Preservation for Appeal R. at 519-539. 
Issue #2: Did the trial court err in granting Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment? 
Standard of review: De novo. "Because, by definition, a district court does not 
resolve issues of fact at summary judgment, we consider the record as a whole and 
review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts 
and fair inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party/' Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, ^ 7, 147 P.3d 439. 
Preservation for Appeal R. at 519-539. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There is no constitutional or statutory provision material to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute over a private lane, Oak Lane, in Alpine, Utah. 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's decision to grant Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, specifically the finding that Defendants have an easement over Oak Lane as a 
matter of law. 
Procedural History 
Plaintiff/Appellant Oak Lane Homeowners Association ("the Association") filed 
this case in district court on November 19, 2003. (R. 2-10.) On April 7, 2004, 
Defendants/Appellees Dennis Griffin and Renae Griffin (collectively "the Griffins") filed 
a motion for summary judgment. (R. 210-288.) On August 20, 2004, the trial court 
granted the Griffins' motion, based on its own research. (R. 374-78.) On December 8, 
2004, the trial court issued a second ruling granting the Griffins' motion, this time on a 
different basis than that of the August 20, 2004 ruling. (R. 441-46.) The Association 
appealed the trial court's rulings to this Court. (R.457-58.) On November 24, 2006, this 
Court reversed the trial court, finding that an issue of fact precluded summary judgment, 
and remanded for further proceedings. (R. 473-76.) 
Back in the trial court, the Griffins filed a second motion for summary judgment 
on July 16, 2007. (R. 660-673.) After briefing and oral arguments, the trial court granted 
the Griffins' motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment on 
December 21, 2007, finding that the Griffins were entitled to an easement on Oak Lane 
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by virtue of the subdivision plat.1 (R. 600-04.) The Association again appeals to this 
Court. 
Statement of Facts 
Oak Lane is a private lane in the Oak Hills Subdivision. (R. 532.) The Oak Hills 
Subdivision was platted in 1977. Id. On January 13, 1977, the seven original owners of 
the five lots in the subdivision signed the plat.2 Id. In the "Owner's Dedication" on the 
plat, the owners expressly refused to dedicate the "Private Lane" to the public by striking 
the dedicatory language: 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT WE, ALL OF THE 
UNDERSIGNED OWNERS OF ALL OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
THE SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE HEREON AND SHOWN ON THIS 
MAP, HAVE CAUSED THE SAME TO BE SUBDIVIDED INTO LOTS, 
BLOCKS, STREETS AND EASEMENTS AND DO HEREBY DEDICATE 
THE STREETS AND OTHER PUBLIC AREAS AS INDICATED HEREON 
FOR PERPETUAL USE OF THE PUBLIC. 
Id. The Alpine City Council accepted the plat on the same day, likewise striking the 
dedicatory acceptance language: 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF ALPINE CITY, COUNTY OF UTAH, 
APPROVES THIS SUBDIVISION AND HEREBY ACCEPTS THE 
DEDICATION OF ALL STREETS, EASEMENTS, AND OTHER PARCELS 
OF LAND INTENDED FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES FOR THE PERPETUAL 
USE OF THE PUBLIC THIS 13th DAY OF JANUARY, A.D. 1977. 
Id. The plat was recorded on February 2, 1977. Id. 
The Griffins purchased Lot 2 of the Oak Hills Subdivision on January 12, 1988. 
1 A true and correct copy of the trial court's findings is included as Addendum A. 
2
 A true and correct copy of the Oak Hills Subdivision plat is included as Addendum B. 
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(R. 132, 139.) Lot 2 is accessed through a public road, High Bench Road. (R. 141.) In 
fact, the garage on Lot 2 can only be accessed via High Bench Road. (R. 123.) The 
original owners of Lot 2, the Van Wagoners, understood that Oak Lane was a private road 
and used it only with permission. (R. 122-24, 128-130.) The Van Wagoners did not 
transfer any interest in Oak Lane to the subsequent owners of Lot 2. Id. The second 
owners of Lot 2, the Watkins, also understood that Oak Lane was a private road and used 
it only with permission. (R. 131-139.) The Griffins, the third owners of Lot 2, have 
occasionally used Oak Lane by driving and parking their vehicles on it. (R. 305.) 
On September 11, 2003, the seven original owners of the Oak Hills Subdivision 
(and Oak Lane) transferred their interest in Oak Lane via quitclaim deed to the 
Association. (R. 535-39.) The Association works to maintain the physical and legal 
aspects of Oak Lane as a private lane. (R. 305.) In an effort to prevent the Griffins' then 
unauthorized use of Oak Lane, in October and November 2003, the Association placed 
boulders on Oak Lane near Lot 2. Id. When the Griffins continued using Oak Lane, the 
Association filed this lawsuit. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case, the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment, finding that the 
Griffins have an easement over the private road, Oak Lane, by virtue of a subdivision 
plat, even though the Griffins have access to their property via a public road. 
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, giving no deference to 
the trial court. The trial court in this case erred when it granted the Griffins' motion for 
summary judgment because the Griffins were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
and there w ere disputed issues of material fact. 
The Griffins were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and therefore were 
not entitled to summary judgment. The trial court found that the Griffins have an 
easement over Oak Lane by virtue of the subdivision plat, which includes the Griffins' 
lot, Lot 2. Utah law recognizes only four types of easements: express, implied, 
prescriptive, and necessity. The Griffins do not meet the requirements of any of these 
easements. Since an easement by plat is not recognized by Utah law. the Griffins are not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment. 
Additionally, there are disputed issues of fact as to the Griffins* use of Oak Lane 
and as to the nature of the ownership of Oak Lane, which prevent summary judgment. 
First, the Griffins claim that they have used Oak Lane to non-permissively access their 
property for a number of years. The Association, on the other hand, claims that the use 
was infrequent and done permissively until October 2003. Second the Association 
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claims full ownership rights to Oak Lane by virtue of a quitclaim deed from the original 
owners of Oak Lane. The Griffins, on the other hand, claim that the quitclaim deed of the 
lane to the Association was invalid and that the individual owners of the lots in the Oak 
Hills Subdivision own the road. In light of the above disputed facts, the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment. 
This Court should therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand 
this case back to the trial court for a trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it granted the Griffins' motion for summary judgment 
and found that the Griffins had an easement over a private lane by virtue of a subdivision 
plat. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may not grant summary judgment 
unless the moving party establishes "[I] that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see also Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 2006 
UT App 465, |^6, 153 P.3d 740. When a court addresses a motion for summary judgment, 
it "must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, Poteet v. 
White, 2006 UT 63 at \1, and should therefore reverse the trial court's decision because 
not only did questions of fact exist with regard to the ownership and use of the road, the 
Griffins were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
First, the Griffins were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Griffins 
cannot meet the requirements for any of the four types of easements recognized by Utah 
courts. Further, there is no support under Utah law7 for an easement by virtue of a plat. 
Thus, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this case back 
to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 
Additionally, the Griffins were not entitled to summary judgment because there 
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were genuine issues as to material facts. In particular, there are questions relating to the 
use, ownership and nature of Oak Lane. 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE 
GRIFFINS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The Griffins did not establish a right to an easement, and therefore judgment as a 
matter of law, under current Utah law. Utah law recognizes four, and only four, types of 
easements. These four easements are express, implied, prescriptive, and necessity. See 
Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at ^8. These four types of easements have been recognized 
under Utah law for decades and have express and settled requirements. As will be shown 
below, the Griffins cannot demonstrate that they have satisfied all of the requirements of 
any of the four types of easements. 
Because there are only four types of easements recognized under Utah law, the 
trial court erred in finding that the Griffins had an easement over Oak Lane by virtue of 
the Oak Hills Subdivision plat. This new type of easement has no basis in Utah law. The 
Griffins were therefore not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment 
should not have entered against the Association. 
A. The Griffms Were Not Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law 
Because They Could Not And Cannot Meet The Requirements Of Any 
Of The Four Easements Recognized Under Utah Law. 
The Griffins do not have an easement on Oak Lane. As noted above, four 
easements are recognized under Utah law: express, implied, prescriptive, and necessity. 
See Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at [^8. The Griffins do not meet all of the requirements of 
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any of the four types of easements. 
1. The Griffins Do Not Have An Express Easement Because There Is 
No Indication That The Parties Intended The Griffins To Have Such 
An Easement. 
The Griffins do not have an express easement over Oak Lane. An express 
easement is the most common type of easement, and it is "expressly created between two 
parties in a land transaction or conveyance by an express grant or an express reservation." 
Potter. 1999 UT App 95 at ^|9. There are no specific requirements for the creation of an 
express easement, so Utah courts look to the u ; intent of the parties to an agreement 
purportedly transferring real property . . . . Words that clearly show intention to grant an 
easement are sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its term.''" Id. 
(quoting War burton v. Virginia Beach Fed Sav & Loan Ass % 899 P.2d 779, 781-82 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995)). Additionally, creation of an express easement requires the mutual 
assent of the parties, as well as consideration. Id. 
In this case, there is indisputably no indication that any owner of Lot 2 ever 
transferred or conveyed an express easement to the Griffins, written or otherwise. In fact, 
all the evidence indicates the contrary. Lot 2's previous owners acknowledge that they 
used Oak Lane with permission of the original owners, not because they had any kind of 
an easement on the road. (R. 122-24. 128-130, 131-139.) Further, the Griffins cannot 
point to any document, fact, or circumstance indicating they have an express easement. 
Therefore, the Griffins do not have an express easement on Oak Lane and were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law under this tenet of the law. 
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2. The Griffins Do Not Have An Easement By Implication Because, At 
A Minimum, The Easement Was Not Necessary For The Enjoyment 
Of Their Property. 
The Griffins do not have an implied easement over Oak Lane. Under Utah law, an 
easement by implication requires 
(1) that unity of title was followed by severance; (2) that the servitude was 
apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of severance; (3) that the easement 
was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4) that 
the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. 
Butler v Lee, 11A P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In this case. Oak Lane is not 
"reasonably necessary to . .. enjoy[]" Lot 2. Indeed, Lot 2 was designed such that it was 
accessible via High Bench Road. (R. 141.) Thus, since that element of the test for an 
easement by implication is not satisfied, the Griffins do not have the easement. 
Moreover, the Griffins do not meet any of the other elements for an implied 
easement. They have not shown (and cannot show) that unity of title was followed by 
severance, that the servitude was apparent at that time, and that the use was continuous 
rather than sporadic. 
Therefore, the Griffins do not have an implied easement on Oak Lane and were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law under this tenet of the law. 
3. The Griffins Do Not Have A Prescriptive Easement Because. At A 
Minimum, The Twenty-Year Adverse Use Requirement Is Not Met. 
The Griffins do not have a prescriptive easement over Oak Lane. To establish a 
prescriptive easement in Utah, a party must show ua use that is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) 
adverse, and (4) continuous for at least twenty years." Potter. 1999 UT App 95 at [^17. 
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While the Griffins' use of Oak Lane may have been open and notorious, the Griffins" use 
of Oak Lane has not been adverse for a period of at least twenty years. In fact, the 
Griffins' use was not adverse until October 2003. when the Association, for the first time, 
sought to prevent the Griffins' from using Oak Lane. (R. 141-42, 226.) 
Thus, it clear that the Griffins do not have a prescriptive easement on Oak Lane. 
4. The Griffins Do Not Have An Easement By Necessity Because 
Another Road Exists That Was Designed As The Ingress And Egress 
To And From Their Lot. 
The Griffins do not have an easement by necessity over Oak Lane. An easement 
by necessity arises "'when there is a conveyance of part of a tract of land which is so 
situated that either the part conveyed or the part retained is surrounded with no access to a 
road to the outer world.'" Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at TJ18. (quoting Tschaggeny v. Union 
Pac. Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976)). 
In Potter, the Utah Court of Appeals declined to find an easement by necessity 
where the property at issue was not landlocked. Id. The court recognized that the party 
asserting that claim had "at least one" other access route to her property, and therefore, 
she could not establish an easement by necessity. Id 
Similarly, in this case, the Griffins' land is not landlocked; they have "at least one*' 
other access route to their property. It is accessible to and from High Bench Road, an 
adjacent public thoroughfare. (R. 141.) In fact, the garage on Lot 2 is only accessible via 
High Bench Road. (R. 123.) Therefore, the Griffins do not have an easement by 
necessity on Oak Lane. The Griffins do not meet the requirements for any easement 
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under Utah law. 
B. The Griffins Were Not Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law 
Because An Easement By Plat Is Not Recognized Under Utah Law. 
Because there is no easement by plat in Utah, the Griffins are not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. As has been noted above, Utah law recognizes four types of 
easements express, implied, prescriptive, and necessity. See Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at 
TJ8. There is no Utah case law or statute that recognizes an easement by plat. Even in the 
Griffins' pleadings in support of their motion for summary judgment, they do not cite one 
Utah case or one Utah statute in support of the easement by plat. The Griffins merely cite 
opinions found in Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law, Utah Real Estate 
Law for Brokers and Salespersons, and American Jurisprudence, and the law in other 
states. (R. 643, 547-49.) None of the Griffins' sources cite Utah law in support of the 
alleged "easement by plat," and none of them are binding sources of Utah law. Neither 
the Griffins nor the trial court cite Utah law in support of their newly created "easement 
by plat." 
The trial court erred in creating an easement by plat. Courts in general and trial 
courts in particular are not the appropriate forum for creating law. Utah courts have long 
acknowledged that u[t]he right and power, as well as the duty, of creating rights and to 
provide remedies, lies with the Legislature, and not with the courts. Courts can only 
protect and enforce existing rights, and they may do that only in accordance with 
established and known remedies." Brown v. Wightman, M Utah 3 L 34, 151 P. 366, 367 
(1915). More recently, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[cjourts are ill-suited for such 
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ventures [into lawmaking]. Courts are unable to fully investigate the ramifications of 
social policies and cannot gauge or build the public consensus necessary to effectively 
implement them." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, [^36, 154 P.3d 808. 
Utah's easement laws are clear and established. The trial court was therefore 
restricted to protecting and enforcing existing rights in accordance with established and 
known remedies. In this case, the trial court improperly created law and a new type of 
easement despite the fact that the Griffins could not identify a single case or statute 
creating an easement by plat under Utah law. A judicially created '"easement by plat'5 is 
ill-considered, particularly in this case. It is clear that the initial owners of Lot 2 never 
intended to use Oak Lane. Creating access to Oak Lane outside of settled Utah law is 
improper and an insufficient basis on wLdch to grant summary judgment. 
In light of the Griffins' failure to meet the requirements for any of the four types of 
easements recognized under Utah law, the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment, and this Court should reverse and remand for a trial. 
II. ADDITIONALLY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE 
BECAUSE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED REGARDING THE 
USE AND OWNERSHIP OF OAK LANE. 
There are disputed issues of fact in this case as to the Griffin's use of Oak Lane 
and as to the exact nature and ownership of Oak Lane. 
First there is a genuine issue as to the nature and extent of the Griffins' use of Oak 
Lane. The Association claims that the Griffins' use of Oak Lane w as sporadic and more 
for additional parking than for access to their home. (R. 306.) The Association further 
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claims that the Griffins' use of Oak Lane was permissive until October 2003, when the 
Association sought to stop the use. (R. 306, 142.) The Griffins claim that they "accessed 
[their] home on Lot 2 on a nearly daily basis" via Oak Lane. (R. 226.) The Griffins 
admit that they used Oak Lane "until October, 2003." Id. These issues of fact regarding 
use are material and should have prevented the entry of summary judgment. 
Second, there is a genuine issue as to the nature of the ownership of Oak Lane. 
The Association claims ownership of Oak Lane by virtue of a quitclaim deed from the 
original owners of Oak Lane. (R. 535-39.) The Griffins', on the other hand, claim that 
Oak Lane is owned by the current owners of the subdivision and that the quitclaim deed is 
ineffective to convey title of Oak Lane to the Association. 
Further, there is indisputably a question of fact as to Oak Lane's status as a private 
lane. As this Court held before in this case, "the question of whether Oak Lane was 
deemed a common-use private lane [rather than a generic private lane] presents a disputed 
issue of material fact." Oak Lane Homeowners Ass 'n v. Griffin, 2006 UT App 465, TflO, 
153 P.3d 740. Despite this explicit finding by this Court, the trial court, on remand, made 
no effort to determine whether Oak Lane was deemed a common-use private lane. In 
fact, the trial court immediately granted a motion for summary judgment, on the eve of 
trial, again finding that there were no disputed facts. These issues of fact regarding the 
ownership of Oak Lane are material and should have prevented the entry of summary 
judgment. 
In light of the above disputed facts as to Oak Lane's use, ownership, and nature, 
16 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, and this Court should reverse and 
remand for a trial. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in the Griffins' favor and remand this case back to the trial court 
for a trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of November 2008. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC 
Stephen] Quesenberry 
Jessi^a^Griffm Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the 12th day of November 2008. two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were hand-delivered to the following: 
SHAWN D. TURNER 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, #B 
P.O. Box 95921 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (December 21, 2007) 
Addendum B - Oak Hills Subdivision Plat (January 13, 1977) 
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Addendum "A" 
Addendum "A" 
rfLED 
Fourth Judic £i Distnc! Cour, 
SHAWN D. TURNER (5813) of Uiah County S.aie of Utar 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C. ,
 ? U ( L^ //^~. 
1218 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite B —'—4^-hLi—A^_L„[jeDUEv 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
(801)446-6464 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and RENAE GRIFFIN; 
Defendants 
DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and RENAE GRIFFIN, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 
V. 
OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
Civil No. 030405130 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This matter came before the Court on October 1, 2007 for hearing on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel Stephen Quesenberry. 
Defendant Renae Griffin was present as was Griffins' counsel Shawn D. Turner. 
The Court having read the pleadings related to this matter filed by the respective parties and having 
heard oral argument as presented by respective counsel it hereby finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Alpine City Council approved and accepted the Oak Hills Haven plat, which contained five lots, 
on January 13, 1977. 
2. In the Owners5 Dedication section of the plat all of the original owners of the land executed a section 
which reads: 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT WE, ALL OF THE UNDERSIGNED 
OWNERS OF ALL OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
HEREON AND SHOWN ON THIS MAP, HAVE CAUSED THE SAME TO BE SUBDIVIDED 
INTO LOTS, BLOCKS, STREETS AND EASEMENTS AND DO HEREBY DEDICATE THE 
STREETS AND OTHER PUBLIC AREAS AS INDICATED HEREON FOR PERPETUAL USE 
OF THE PUBLIC. 
3. The portion of the Dedication beginning with "AND DO HEREBY" and continuing thereafter to the 
end is crossed out on the plat. 
4. The plat clearly identifies Oak Lane as a "Private Lane". 
5. The Oak Hills Haven Subdivision consists of five lots. 
6. Defendants, Dennis and ReNae Griffin own Lot 2 of the Oak Hills Haven Subdivision. 
7. The Griffins purchased the property in 1988, 
8. For almost sixteen years, and until October of 2003, the Griffins accessed their home on Lot 2 on a 
nearly daily basis by using Oak Lane, the cul de sac in the Oak Hills Haven Subdivision. 
9. In 2003 all of the other lot owners in the Subdivision formed the Oak Lane Homeowners Association. 
10. On or about July 22,2003, the Association obtained a quit claim deed from the original owners of the 
lots in the subdivision to the property comprising the road. 
11. Based solely on this quit claim deed, the Plaintiff claims ownership of the road. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff has standing to bring its action in this matter. 
2. When the Oak Lane Subdivision was created, an easement was created over the private lane, 
2 
contained in the subdivision, for all those property owneis who abut the lane 
3 The Griffins are pioperty owners whose property abuts the lane 
4 The Griffins property was sold to them by reference to ihe lecoided Plat and their pioperty is 
described by reference to that plat 
5 The Gnffins have an easement, for access, ingress and egress from Oak Lane to their propeity 
Dated thisjx^ day of December, 2007 
BY THE COURT ^ 
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